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Abstract 
The story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution at sixty years remains contested. The current 
center-right government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at once embraces the 
Revolution and yet at the same time trumpets the failure of the liberal states of the West. 
Hungarians are encouraged to view the authoritarian politics of Vladmir Putin as a 
successful model worthy of emulation. In this light the liberal state envisioned by many 
of the revolutionaries, let alone the liberal state expected by the European Union stands 
in contrast with one of the principal tenets of the ruling FIDESz/Christian Democrat 
(KDNP) coalition. At the same time, the current yearning for an illiberal state accords 
with a strand of desire more akin to those who supported Cardinal Mindszenty during the 
Revolution and by extension his sympathy for the authoritarian regime of Miklós Horthy. 
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The story of the 1956 Revolution is a complicated one at best. The intense nationalism 
generated by the event created odd bedfellows whose immediate interest was the 
expulsion of the Soviet Union from the country. Students demanding liberal reform in the 
street insisted on the return of former prime minister Imre Nagy, a communist who only 
gradually joined the Revolution. The multi-party revolutionary state that he helped forge 
was made up of parties and personages he had helped destroy during the short-lived 
Republic in 1945-1948. Cardinal Mindszenty and other apologists for the Kingdom of 
Hungary, which was obliterated in World War II, garnered loyalty among many of the 
revolutionaries. But the Revolution was brutally crushed and revolutionaries from a wide 
spectrum of political beliefs, including Imre Nagy, were put to death through a process 
of juridical murder. Almost immediately a lost-cause narrative was created in the West, 
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encapsulated by Time Magazine’s 1956 “Man of the Year” depicting a Hungarian 
freedom fighter standing bravely against unjust Soviet oppression and occupation.2  
The didactic of the Cold War ensured that the much more complicated story of the 
politics of the Revolution were subdued. It is no surprise then that the ending of 
communist rule and the establishment of the Hungarian Republic in 1989 heralded a 
debate over the Revolution and its relationship to the newly established Republic as 
political parties utilized selected strands of the story to legitimize their various platforms. 
The center-left led by the Socialists (MSzP) and the Free Democrats (SzDSz) claimed the 
legacy of Imre Nagy and forwarded a platform that encouraged European integration. The 
center-right led first by the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and then the Young 
Democrats (FIDESz) remained wary of the communist legacy and claimed a more 
nationalist narrative that legitimized Hungary’s thousand-year history which included the 
legacy of the Miklós Horthy regime (1920-1944) that allied Hungary to the Axis. These 
strands of history utilized by both factions provided plenty of fodder for mud-slinging, 
which was put on full display during the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Revolution.  
The story of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution at sixty years remains contested. The 
current center-right government led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at once embraces 
the Revolution and yet at the same time trumpets the failure of the liberal states of the 
West. In this light the liberal state envisioned by many of the revolutionaries, let alone 
the liberal state expected by the European Union stands in contrast with one of the 
principal tenets of the ruling FIDESz/Christian Democrat (KDNP) coalition. At the same 
time, the current yearning for an illiberal state accords with a strand of desire more akin 
to those who supported Cardinal Mindszenty during the Revolution and by extension his 
sympathy for the authoritarian regime of Miklós Horthy.  
The collapse of communist power in 1989 Hungary was marked by both an 
unstable economy and an undermining of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party’s 
(Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt, MSzMP) legitimacy. This was on full display at the 
funeral of Imre Nagy on 16 June. The demand for the recovery of his body and the funeral 
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broadened into a re-evaluation of the Revolution. At Nagy’s reburial Tibor Méray 
eulogized, “If you are without guilt then those that sent you to the gallows are murderers. 
Let their punishment be the contempt of the nation…the nations of the world know that 
this funeral was not a gift of the regime, but won by the people” (Méray, 1989; Kis, 1995: 
45; Benziger, 2008: 26-29). As historians such as András Bozoki and Rudolf L. Tőkés 
have shown, the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Republic demonstrated 
the many fractures within the opposition, but it is telling that the Hungarian people 
rejected MSzMP hegemony overwhelmingly in a referendum that stripped them of their 
power in November that same year (Tőkés, 1996; Bozóki, 2002). The bitter truth that 
many Hungarians knew, but could not publically express, now became institutionalized 
by the First Act of Parliament 1990 which proclaimed that the 1956 Revolution was a 
War of Independence. What seemed like a triumph, however, almost immediately began 
to sow the seeds of acrimony. The original draft of the bill had included Nagy’s name as 
the symbolic head of the Revolution. It also named the perpetrators of the terror that 
followed. In a last-minute maneuver, the names were removed, and hostility and mistrust 
between the MDF and the center-left deepened. For some, Nagy’s communist past was 
unpalatable, and others worried about linkages with the communist past that might damn 
their political careers, revealing the uneasiness that many felt regarding the complexity 
of the politics surrounding the Revolution (Benziger, 2008: 118). 
The inability of the MDF to right the economy and the loss of one million jobs 
lead many Hungarians to yearn for the years under János Kádár and its social security 
system that had raised many Hungarian’s standard of living, albeit in comparison to other 
countries under Soviet sway. The Socialist Party (MSzP) that had been formed from the 
MSzMP in the Fall of 1989 now saw its fortunes reversed and came to power in coalition 
with the SzDSz in 1994 (Szamuely, 1996: 67; Rácz, 2003: 446). The legacy of the 
Revolution loomed large, and personages at odds with each other in 1956 were now joined 
in an uncomfortable marriage featuring those whose legacy included a role in the 
suppression of the Revolution and the consolidation of the People’s Republic under Kádár 
and former revolutionaries. What made this a most bitter pill to swallow was the Socialist 
Party’s bid to co-opt Nagy’s legacy through a memorial bill. In this way they would seek 
to redress the insult perpetrated by the removal of Nagy’s name in the First Act of 
Parliament and further legitimize their political standing through linkage to a 
revolutionary martyr. The bitter debate that ensued ensured the many factional 
interpretations of the Revolution and Nagy were enshrined in the minutes of parliament. 
K. P. BENZIGER  COJOURN 1:3 (2016) 
The center-right parties asserted that Nagy was a follower of events and therefore should 
be memorialized in concert along with all of the other revolutionary martyrs. Ottó 
Sándorffy of the Smallholders Party claimed that Nagy “…knew his communist comrades 
would never forgive his desire to remain Hungarian…[he] would never have wanted to 
be separated from his companions who fought by his side.” He then proceeded to read the 
names of those who had been killed during Kádár’s reign of terror that followed the 
Revolution into the minutes of parliament forcing all members to stand out of respect for 
the dead (Sándorffy, 1997). With the Socialists holding a majority in parliament, the bill 
officially naming Nagy a vertanu (blood witness) passed, but for a brief moment the 
coalition that had toppled the MSzMP in 1989 was brought together including most of 
the members of the MSzP coalition partner SzDSz (Benziger, 2008: 119-126).                  
Interestingly, FIDESz whose leader Viktor Orbán had captured the imagination of 
many young people with his demand for liberal democracy at the funeral of Nagy, took a 
sharp turn to the right after the second national election. Unable to gain political traction 
with the electorate as a center-left party, FIDESz embraced a Christian nationalist 
narrative and critiqued the Socialist/SzDSz embrace of austerity demanded by the World 
Bank and the IMF. This appealed to a large section of the polity that had been left out of 
the transition to capitalism and those who were repelled by the return of former 
communists through the guise of the Socialist Party. Like the former MDF prime minster 
József Antall, Orbán embraced Hungary’s thousand-year old history that included the 
interwar regime of Miklós Horthy (1920-1944) who had allied Hungary with the Axis 
(Lendvai, 2012: 68). The center-left charged the center-right of reworking history in order 
to legitimize Hungary’s interwar regime while avoiding the subject of the country’s 
genocide that claimed the lives of 560,000 Jews and left the country in ruins. While the 
center-left was accused of promoting the failed agenda of the socialist past, worse yet, it 
was accused of protecting those who had aided in maintaining the Soviet yoke over 
Hungary for forty-four years. The bitter politics did little to ameliorate Hungary’s 
economic woes, and FIDESz convinced the polity to give them the reins of power in the 
next national election in 1998 only to turn them over yet again to the Socialists in 2002. 
Though critiquing the demands for austerity, FIDESz joined the Socialists in the push for 
Hungary’s entrance into the European Union which Hungary joined in 2004. 
On the eve of the fiftieth anniversary of the Revolution, the Socialists won an 
unprecedented second term in power. The election was close, and revelations later that 
year that the Socialist Party had lied about the state of the economy during the election 
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campaign created uproar within the center-right opposition parties and led to popular 
protests across Hungary that culminated in a series of riots during the fiftieth anniversary 
commemorations. Lines had already been drawn between the Socialist coalition and many 
of the Revolutionaries who were still living. The pleas made by Socialist Prime Minister 
Ferenc Gyurcsány and President László Sólyom, a former member of the MDF, for a 
unified celebration went unheeded by many. Former revolutionary and FIDESz MP Mária 
Wittner claimed that a line of righteousness divided those who had fought for the 
revolution and those who had suppressed it (Gréczy, 2006: 3). Likewise, noted 
revolutionary Imre Mécs from SzDSZ and Miklós Vásárhelyi who had been part of 
Nagy’s government asserted that this was impossible (Vásárhelyi, Mécs, 1997). The 
negotiated regime change of 1989 had assured democracy, but not the promise of justice 
that was inexorably linked to the 1956 Revolution. This problem is highlighted in the 
2010 film Bűn és Büntetlenség (Crime and Impunity) centered on Béla Biszku, Interior 
Minister under János Kádár, who is portrayed living happily in his village convinced that 
he had served his country through his role in the terror (Novák, 2010). In the absence of 
substantive legal proceedings against those responsible for the many crimes committed 
during the demobilization of the revolution, there was no mechanism to re-examine 
grievances in a way that permitted some kind of national atonement and forgiveness 
(Benziger, 2008:158). In this frenzied atmosphere, FIDESz held a counter-
commemoration on 23 October, the day the Revolution began in 1956, which dwarfed 
the official commemorations. Viktor Orbán ripped into the Socialists “…they [the 
Socialists] took away the right of free elections…it happened in a country twice tormented 
by the greatest lie of the twentieth century, Socialism!” (quoted in Benziger, 2008: 159-
162). Orbán’s call for a second revolution resonated with the polity, and the government’s 
calls for austerity played into his hands. As Paul Lendvai asserts, government plans for 
the reform of health care and higher education that included higher fees were rejected in 
a 2008 referendum by 82% of those voting (Lendvai, 2012: 198). In 2010, the Hungarian 
people delivered a resounding victory to the FIDESz/Christian Democrat coalition 
providing them with a super-majority in parliament. The SzDSz ceased to exist, and the 
Socialist Party was shattered. Center-left political parties have been unable to gain their 
footing to this date.   
Orbán’s promise of a new constitution legitimized the Christian national politics 
of the interwar years. The National Avowal states, “…Saint Stephen…made our country 
part of Christian Europe one thousand years ago...We date the restoration of our country’s 
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self-determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from the second day of May 
1990, when the first freely elected body of popular representatives was formed 
(Magyarország Alaptörvéne, 2011: 10656).” In a single stroke the constitution legislated 
history by separating the Horthy regime from its collaboration with the German 
occupation and the Hungarian Republic from its two communist regimes. The 
constitution also seems to remedy the lack of justice in relationship to these time periods 
by stating: “We deny any statute of limitations for the inhuman crimes committed against 
the Hungarian nation and its citizens under the national socialist and communist 
dictatorships (Magyarország Alaptörvénye, 2011: 6).” Béla Biszku was tried and 
convicted under this law for his role in a massacre of workers in Salgótarján in November 
1956 (New York Times, 2016).3 But the hopefulness for justice was undermined by the 
forced early retirement of judges, and majority coalition appointments seemed to indicate 
the breakdown of the separation of powers through the creation of a majoritarian 
judiciary. Most recently, critique of the EU and calls for the creation of an illiberal state 
have become increasingly shrill. In a 2014 speech in Romania, Orbán rejected liberal 
values as being corrupt and claimed that Hungary was now building a state whose 
“character…is not liberal (Orbán, 2014).” More recently on the anniversary of the 1848 
Revolution, Orbán blamed the EU for “mass migration,” a reference to the current refugee 
crisis, claiming that it would undermine Christianity and the nation states of Europe 
through a blending of populations and cultures (Orbán, 2016). Hungary’s rhetoric and 
actions sets it in stark contrast to the EU’s promotion of democracy and the development 
of civil society, and Orbán’s idealization of the authoritarian politics of Russia’s Vladmir 
Putin only heightens this concern (Dercsényi, 2015). The tilt towards the right and the 
inability of the center-left to create a viable opposition has served to strengthen the right 
wing, most notably Jobbik (the party whose name means literally „the better one”). They 
admire the fascist politics of Ferenc Szálasi, who at the end of World War II succeeded 
Horthy in a German-backed coup d’etat on 15 October 1944, after Horthy attempted to 
withdraw Hungary from the war. Like their fascist predecessors, Jews and Gypsies are 
unwelcome outsiders for them, and reunion with Hungarians living outside the borders of 
the state is central to their ideology. They now constitute Hungary’s second largest party 
and openly compete with FIDESz, moving Hungary further rightward (Kirchick, 2012; 
Vági, Csősz, Kádár, 2013: 361-363; Népszabadság, 2014: 1; Miklós, 2015).   
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The nativist sentiment intimately intertwined with the intense nationalism evoked 
by Orbán and Jobbik was fortified by the passage of close to 400,000 mostly Muslim 
refugees through Hungary during the summer of 2015. The event provided both parties 
with images that seemed to confirm that the enemy was at the door. A fence has been 
erected to staunch the human flow and Orbán has called for work camps for illegal 
refugees (Traynor, 2015; Sarnyai, 2015). And yet, Hungary needs the EU for badly 
needed infrastructure projects. For example, between 2007-2013 the EU contributed 720 
million Euros for the new number four metro in Budapest and will spend another 344 
billion Euros on infrastructure projects through 2016. In spite of its intense critique of the 
EU, FIDESz has to play within the rules of the institution or risk substantial financial 
downturn (Ambrus and Hargitai, 2016: 1, 6). In the absence of a coherent center-left 
challenge, Jobbik claims to be the party most ready to take on the EU and the threat posed 
by outsiders because they do not have to make compromises with the liberal institutions 
they excoriate. 
Would Hungary actually leave the EU? On the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of 
the Revolution Hungarians went to the polls to vote on a referendum that asked them if 
they wanted the EU to set the number of refugees that can settle in Hungary without the 
permission of parliament (Lencsés, 2016: 3). The referendum formally failed, because 
only 43% of the electorate voted, with participation thus falling below the 50-percent 
validity threshold. Orbán posed this vote as a test of national sovereignty (Kingsley, 
2016), however, and hails the results as a confirmation thereof, given that over 98% of 
those who participated in the referendum voted against co-operating with the EU’s 
resettlement plans. 
Up to this point the FIDESz/KDNP coalition has been successful in part by 
scapegoating the EU and playing into a deep-set national pride that is intimately 
connected to its more than thousand-year-old history on the European continent. 
Highlighting its connection to the medieval Hungarian Kingdom, and the interwar regime 
of Miklós Horthy that had restored Hungary as a Kingdom after World War I, underscores 
the importance of sovereignty in contrast to German and then Soviet occupation. Orbán’s 
ability to convince the polity to maintain majoritarian rule through two national elections 
has swung the country to the right and enabled the regime to seriously threaten the rule 
of law and openly challenge the rational legal principles on which the EU was founded. 
Hungary is not alone in this project, but on the sixtieth anniversary of the Revolution it 
seems strange that – while studies of the Cold War highlight this event as one of the great 
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challenges to Soviet hegemony – the country seems ready to reject the values embraced 
by that Revolution. Liberal values were ready-made not only by the contest of the Cold 
War, but by earlier attempts to create a liberal state as exemplified by the 1848 Hungarian 
Revolution. 
Perhaps this sentiment is overblown, as the Revolution never had time to mature 
and we will never know how long Hungarians might have accepted a national communist 
like Imre Nagy as leader of a multi-party state. Indeed, we cannot know whether Hungary 
would have continued in the direction of a liberal state. We are left instead with the 
idealism of the “Sixteen Points” that animated thousands of university students and 
helped stimulate a mass mobilization that humiliated the Soviet Union sixty years ago. 
In this light, we do understand the linkage between 1989 and the short-lived 
Revolution of 1956, when Imre Mécs asked Hungarians at the funeral of Imre Nagy, 
“How could [we, Hungarians] live for 33 years without freedom?” (Mécs, 1989). 
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